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Last year I visited Berlin and STASI HQ to study their methods. STASI was one of the most efficient and successful counterintelligence agencies in the world.
That being said, I was exposed from an early age to the communist type of intelligence agencies, but what I wasn’t expecting was that the corporate world and many countries know nothing about the modus operandi of human intelligence and the super-successful, efficient method of a female intelligence operative hacking your brain, stealing your life and secrets, and later applying the MICE methodology to convert you.
In today’s world, algorithms mediate intimacy and provide direct access to information.
Yet despite the dazzling veneer of platforms and encryption, the backbone of human intelligence (HUMINT) remains stubbornly constant: cultivate trust, read human weakness, choreograph relationships, and convert proximity into access.
What has changed is the cost and the tempo.
In Australia, espionage cost at least $12.5 billion in 2023–24, which includes direct damage from cyber-attacks, insider threats, and intellectual property theft, as well as efforts to reduce these risks; it’s estimated that “tens of billions” more in losses were avoided, and just one week of major cyber sabotage could lead to nearly $6 billion in costs, according to a 2025 report by the ASIO. AIC
In the United States, a continuously updated CSIS survey lists 224 publicly reported Chinese espionage incidents since 2000, with 69% reported after Xi Jinping took office, and long-term economic losses “in the billions” alongside severe national-security damage (e.g., weapons-related data). HUMINT remains a collection staple next to cyber: recruitment via “sex or money” persists alongside unconventional access tactics. CSIS
I write this article from lived experience: educated and trained in military and diplomatic security intelligence before decades in investigations and interrogations, I learned that the most decisive weapon is not a gadget but a human who understands fear, aspiration, and attention.
In today’s social-media theatre, female operatives—state-tasked or criminally motivated—often gain asymmetric advantages because the platforms reward precisely the signals that ease elicitation: warmth, lifestyle, availability, and parasocial intimacy.
The result is classical tradecraft executed at digital speed.
Female HUMINT operations today are a continuity of historic methods—seduction, secrecy, and social positioning—scaled by feeds. The case studies below show the “honey trap” reframed into a broader ecosystem of influence: part espionage, part propaganda, and part fraud—all powered by social platforms.
From Mata Hari to the SOE’s Virginia Hall and Nancy Wake, women have long exploited a recurring cognitive bias: institutional underestimation lowers scrutiny and invites proximity. A modern example is Anna Chapman, who was arrested in 2010 as part of the Russian Illegals Program; beyond the sensationalized media coverage, the operational lesson remains unchanged—credible persona, patience, proximity. The medium changes; the playbook doesn’t. Wikipedia
“But Chapman is Cold War nostalgia.” This statement is both accurate and irrelevant. As the CSIS data show, traditional recruitment and influence still sit beside cyber, not behind it. The continuity is the story.
Indian authorities allege a network designed to invite, entice, and co-opt social media creators—offering visas and hospitality via Pakistan High Commission events—then escalating to money, intimacy, and tasking. In the Jyoti (Rani) Malhotra case, open sources detail ~377,000 YouTube subscribers, multiple Pakistan trips, alleged contact with an expelled High Commission official, and encrypted-app grooming with disguised contact names; investigators frame this as propaganda and collection. India Today
Parallel reporting lays out the method: official invites → visas → staged access → enticements (including classic honey-trap elements) → gradual coercion and tasking; large-follower creators (e.g., Jasbir Singh, ~1.1 million) are prized for reach, cover, and mobility. India Express
Operational takeaway: social capital (followers, perceived authenticity) has become an intelligence asset. The cover is not a job—it’s a lifestyle brand.
The Nomma Zarubina case in the U.S. alleges recruitment by the FSB (codename “Alyssa”), cultivation of networks among journalists and experts, and false statements to the FBI regarding those ties. This is not a case of snatching up secrets; rather, it is a strategy of social positioning for influence, akin to HUMINT, but disguised as public expertise. Russia
Operational takeaway: the persona is the product. Influence is an objective in itself, not merely a conduit for stolen files.
In Germany, authorities have moved from the 2024 arrest of Jian Guo (aide to AfD figure Maximilian Krah) on suspicion of spying for China to lifting Krah’s parliamentary immunity in September 2025 and conducting searches tied to alleged Chinese payments. The sequence shows a familiar tactic: recruit the person one ring from power, blend influence, access, and money, and then allow the person to launder intent.
Operational takeaway: proximity beats penetration. The most effective agent may be the assistant—not the intruder at the safe. The Guardian</P
The process involves building a persona and ensuring its plausibility. The process involves creating a multi-platform identity that has a coherent backstory, mutuals, and a consistent content cadence. Visuals generate parasocial trust; captions are pre-prime targets to confide. The Indian creator cases illustrate how visibility itself authenticates access.
OSINT-driven reconnaissance. Targets are mapped via follows, likes, conference photos, and family posts—inferring travel patterns, procurement cycles, and stressors. German investigations around Krah/Guo underscore that network position matters more than title.
Contact & grooming. Outreach begins with professional pretexts (“collab,” “press profile”) or personal ones (shared heritage/mutual friends). Encrypted apps and disappearing messages accelerate intimacy and lower inhibitions—explicit in the Malhotra reporting.
Elicitation & tasking. Requests escalate from “vibe checks” to operational asks: photos, layouts, and procedures; or reputational asks: on-camera narratives to seed propaganda. Indian officials describe a systematic ISI shift: use creators for espionage-cum-propaganda, not just collection.
Deniability & churn. When heat rises, accounts vanish; handlers become “just travel agents”; relationships are “personal.” Rapid evidence capture is crucial before profiles disappear.
Argument. Female-fronted HUMINT thrives online because platforms are tuned to warmth, trust, and ambient intimacy—traits that bypass technical controls and organizational ego. Where boards imagine the threat as “hackers,” the real breach often walks in through the heart: flattery, shared outrage, “opportunities,” and accelerated closeness.
Some activity is primarily criminal. But the Indian crackdown documents a hybrid model—collection plus narrative shaping—which is quintessential intelligence work. Likewise, CSIS reminds us that alongside vast cyber activity, China continues to use traditional recruitment, including sex- or money-based inducements—i.e., HUMINT. A purely “cybercrime” lens misses state-aligned influence goals.
Drawing on years in interrogations and corporate investigations, here is a short, operational playbook you can train into muscle memory:
Separate identities. It’s crucial to maintain a clear separation between personal and professional personas, avoid using real-time travel geotags, and refrain from posting org charts, access badges, or floor plans.
Two-channel verification. Any “recruiter/journalist/collab” must be verified via a second, known-good channel and corporate-domain video before discussing access or documents.
DM discipline. There should be no screenshots, layouts, or “quick photos” of restricted spaces in DMs, nor should there be any unsanctioned screen shares.
Intimacy triggers. Train staff to spot accelerated intimacy (love-bombing, confessional voice notes, flattery, and grievance mirroring). These are elicitation setups.
Ego and grievance management. Adversaries hunt for the discouraged and overlooked. Close those seams—your people’s hurt is the adversary’s opening.
Red-team the feed. Run exercises that start in public posts and move into DMs; measure who accepts invites, who overshares, and who resists.
Rapid containment. On suspected compromise: preserve devices, snapshot profiles, capture app metadata, and engage counsel/forensics early—before accounts vanish.
From a life shaped by war zones and intelligence work to decades of investigations, one lesson endures: the human element never retires.
Female operatives, often underestimated, exploit exactly what our culture now monetizes—connection and attention. The method is old. The medium is new. And the stakes are measurable: billions in national losses and incalculable damage to trust.
The frontline of defence remains human before technical habits, before tools, and disciplined before denial.
From my own years in military and diplomatic security – intelligence, I learned that the first breach isn’t digital—it’s human.
A rushed confession, a flattered ego, a private message accepted at 1:13 a.m.
That’s why this article emphasizes habits before tools: separate personas, verify across channels, and never reward accelerated intimacy with access.
